




*Corresponding author: Nani Harlinda Nurdin, Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Indonesia Timur, Makassar, Indonesia

E-mail: naniharlinda69@gmail.com

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Institutionalizing Network Governance: A Strategic Approach to Poverty Alleviation in South Sulawesi

Nani Harlinda Nurdin^{1*}, Zulkarnain Hamson², & Novayanti Sophia Rukmana³

¹Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Indonesia Timur, Makassar, Indonesia

²Communication, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Indonesia Timur, Makassar, Indonesia

³Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Negeri Makassar, Makassar, Indonesia

Abstract: This study investigates the dynamics of network governance within the implementation of poverty alleviation policies, specifically focusing on the Regional Poverty Alleviation Coordination Team (TKPKD) in South Sulawesi, Indonesia. It employs a comparative qualitative case study design conducted in Bone Regency and Makassar City. Data gathered from semi-structured interviews with cross-sectoral key informants and structural policy document analysis were systematically processed using thematic analysis anchored in Richard Scott's three institutional pillars. The results reveal that the transition from a formal administrative coordination framework to a substantive collaborative model experiences stagnation at both practical and institutional levels. Major findings indicate that network governance blockages are heavily driven by rigid bureaucratic formalization within the regulative pillar, persistent sectoral egos and deficient moral commitments within the normative pillar, and deep conceptual distances regarding poverty metrics within the cultural-cognitive pillar. Consequently, the institutional formalization of regional networks merely acts as a tool for achieving technical administrative legitimacy, exhibiting a pattern of isomorphic mimicry rather than mobilizing transformative collective actions for local poverty reduction.

Keywords: Collective Action, Institutional Pillars, Network Governance, Poverty Alleviation

1. Introduction

To this day, poverty remains a complex problem and multidimensional (Balasubramanian et al., 2023) and is a challenge globally (Gumede, 2021) in Indonesia. The complexity of the poverty problem in Indonesia is one of the obstacles to achieving inclusive and sustainable development. To address these challenges, a serious effort is certainly required through effective approaches and strategies. The effectiveness of these approaches can be achieved through synergy among all stakeholders, each of whom possesses different resources, authority, and capabilities (Nurdin, 2022). Therefore, this problem cannot be solved by a single program or a single organization alone.

Poverty is also evident in South Sulawesi, which has a poverty rate of 8.70% (BPS, 2024) with variations in poverty conditions across regions indicating that the issue of poverty does not occur solely within a uniform socioeconomic and administrative context, but is also



influenced by the specific characteristics of each region. These differences in poverty conditions are important because the poverty alleviation policies designed by the government generally need to be translated into programs that are tailored to the conditions and needs of each region or area. With a rate of 8.7%, the poverty rate in South Sulawesi indicates a significant disparity, particularly in regencies and cities with a higher concentration of poverty, such as Bone Regency and Makassar City.

Various initiatives have been developed by the central and local governments (Assyafaah et al., n.d.) through poverty alleviation policies and programs such as the Family Hope Program (PKH), Non-Cash Social Assistance (BPNT), and the Village Fund, however, these programs have not yet yielded optimal results. This is because these poverty alleviation programs are implemented using a sectoral approach that focuses solely on individual sectors, coupled with weak synergy among stakeholders. This kind of institutional fragmentation will not lead to adequate integration of planning and resource sharing. In fact, the most critical issue in the implementation of poverty alleviation policies lies in how these actors coordinate and integrate their actions.

One of the institutions that plays a key role in coordinating various poverty alleviation efforts at the regional level is the Regional Poverty Alleviation Coordination Team (TKPKD). The TKPKD was established to strengthen coordination among local governments, the private sector, the community, and nongovernmental organizations in designing and implementing poverty alleviation policies. This structure indicates that, institutionally, poverty alleviation has been designed as a cross-sectoral process requiring the involvement of more than one actor and organization. The TKPKD is understood not only as an administrative forum but also as an arena for interaction among actors in the governance process. However, the existence of this formal structure does not always result in substantive collaboration. This phenomenon occurs in Bone Regency and Makassar City (Irawan & Bahri, n.d.; Sopia et al., 2025), which still face challenges regarding the regularity of interactions, stakeholder engagement, the division of responsibilities, and monitoring and accountability mechanisms. Given this reality, coordination primarily takes the form of administrative meetings and interorganizational communication. Meanwhile, the processes of problem identification, planning, and accountability, which should be carried out collaboratively have not yet been implemented optimally.

These limitations in the collaboration process indicate a gap between formal coordination and substantive cooperation practices on the ground. To address this issue, the network governance perspective offers a more relevant analytical framework (Christophe Assens, 2016). This approach views policy as the result of interactions between public and non-public actors whose interests, resources, and capacities are interdependent. This suggests that the quality of governance is determined not only by the existence of organizational structures, but also by the intensity of interactions, the exchange of resources and information, negotiations, participation in decision-making, and the actors' ability to generate collective action (Clauss & Ritala, 2023). In addition, the literature on governance networks (Bodin, 2020; Davidson et al., 2019; Farmaki, 2020; Gutiérrez & Glückler, 2022; Klijn et al., 2015) also highlights the importance of relationships among actors in addressing complex public issues.

Applying the network governance perspective alone has limitations in explaining why formally established network structures do not always result in substantive collaboration. Actors do not interact within a neutral institutional space, and their behavior is influenced by formal rules, norms regarding responsibilities and appropriate conduct, as well as shared understandings that develop through institutional interactions and experiences. Therefore, to understand why formal coordination remains administrative in nature and why actors' involvement does not always develop into collective action, an in-depth analysis of the institutional conditions that shape behavior and relationships among actors is necessary.

Scott's institutional theory addresses these limitations through a perspective that integrates an analysis of network governance with three main pillars: the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive pillars (Scott, 2014). The regulative pillar relates to rules, mandates, procedures, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms that guide actors' actions. The normative pillar relates to values, obligations, commitments, and expectations regarding how actors should fulfill their roles. Meanwhile, the cultural-cognitive pillar relates to shared understandings, perceptions, beliefs, and routines formed through interactions among actors (Clauss & Ritala, 2023). These three pillars enable this study not only to explain whether the actors coordinate but also to uncover the reasons why such coordination either develops or fails to transform into institutionalized collaborative practices.

Several previous studies have demonstrated the importance of inter-institutional networks in the policy-making and regional development processes. Research (Nurdin & Alwi², 2019), For example, it highlights the importance of inter-organizational networks in the regional development planning process, while other studies included in the previous review indicate that policy implementation involving multiple actors faces challenges related to coordination, differences in perception, and capacity constraints across organization (de Mesa, 2019; Munim, 2020; Soleimani et al., 2023). However, the study has not specifically explained how network governance mechanisms are institutionalized in poverty alleviation policies through the TKPKD, particularly by linking network dynamics to the three institutional pillars.

Studies on governance networks in the Indonesian context have so far tended to view actor involvement and coordination as common characteristics of such networks. A more contextual understanding of how these mechanisms function in regions with different administrative and socioeconomic characteristics is still greatly needed. For this reason, a comparative analysis between Bone Regency and Makassar City becomes crucial. This comparison is important not to determine which region is more successful, but to identify how differences in institutional conditions affect coordination, actor participation, and the process of institutionalizing network governance.

Based on the issues outlined above, this study aims to analyze how institutional pillars function within the network governance of poverty alleviation policies in South Sulawesi, with a particular focus on coordination and collaboration mechanisms within the TKPKD of Bone Regency and Makassar City, as well as the institutional conditions that influence relationships among actors. In addition, this study also seeks to identify institutional strategies that can strengthen the institutionalization of network governance so that formal coordination can evolve into more substantive collaboration that is responsive to the local context and sustainable.

2. Literature Review

2.1 *Network Governance In Public Policy*

Network governance refers to a form of governance that involves cross-sector collaboration among public, private, and civil society actors in the formulation and implementation of public policy (Alfiandri & Irawan, 2023; Halilm et al., 2024). This approach has emerged in response to the increasing complexity of contemporary public issues, which can no longer be effectively resolved by a single actor or through conventional bureaucratic hierarchies (Ansell & Torfing, 2022). The key characteristic of network governance lies in the shift from vertical command-and-control to horizontal coordination based on negotiation, resource sharing, and interdependence among actor (Provan & Lemaire, 2012).

The key characteristic of network governance lies in the shift from vertical command-and-control to horizontal coordination based on negotiation, resource sharing, and interdependence among actors (Milward & Provan, 2023). Although the actors involved have different interests and institutional backgrounds, the network's survival is sustained by shared goals in addressing public issues (Nahravi et al., 2021).

On the other hand, several studies on implementation in developing countries point to a wide gap between the design of formal network structures and the reality of governance on the ground. Several studies suggest that the involvement of multiple actors often reaches an impasse due to communication barriers and a lack of operational integration (Nurdin & Alwi2, 2019; Rukmana, 2022). The networks that form are often merely superficial due to the strong influence of a rigid bureaucracy and the lack of regulatory synergy across different levels of government.

Given this complexity, an analysis of the network's overall functioning must go beyond mere structural aspects to address the institutional dimensions that surround it. Institutional theory offers an important perspective on how structures, rules, and value systems within organizations both shape and guide policy effectiveness (Scott, 2001, 2014). Through the interaction of its three main pillars: regulatory, normative, and cultural-cognitive institutional theory provides an analytical framework for examining how consensus, the legitimacy of actions, and shared understanding among actors can be built to optimize the performance of governance networks in mitigating complex public issues.

2.2 The Three Pillars of Theori Institutional Theory

Institutional theory offers an in-depth perspective on how social structures achieve resilience and sustainability through elements that provide stability and meaning to collective action (Scott, 2001). Scott posits that an institution is supported by three interrelated pillars: the regulative, the normative, and the cultural-cognitive. These three pillars operate along a continuum ranging from formal, coercive aspects to informal aspects embedded in the collective consciousness of the actors. The existence of these pillars serves to guide, constrain, and legitimize the behavior of both individuals and organizations within a system.

The regulatory pillar is the most visible formal element because it relies on the processes of rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement of sanctions (Scott, 2014). The primary mechanism driving this pillar is enforced compliance (expedience) to avoid punishment or to obtain financial or political incentives. In the realm of public policy, the regulatory pillar takes the form of laws, Decisions (SK), standard operating procedures (SOP), and other written legal instruments. The existence of these formal instruments is crucial for creating legal certainty and establishing clear lines of responsibility among bureaucratic actors.

The normative pillar, unlike the coercive regulatory approach, operates through the internalization of values and norms that establish role expectations and moral standards within an organization. Values define what is desired or considered valuable, while norms determine the socially acceptable ways to achieve those goals (Scott, 2008). Compliance with the normative pillar is driven not by fear of legal sanctions, but by moral obligation and a sense of social responsibility. The behavior of actors guided by the normative pillar tends to focus on what should be done to uphold reputation, professional ethics, and a commitment to cross-sectoral cooperation.

The cultural-cognitive pillar complements this framework by addressing the deepest dimensions of institutionalization namely, mental schemas, shared interpretations, and the perspectives that actors use to make sense of the reality around them. Institutionalization at the cultural-cognitive level occurs when a particular action or understanding has come to be taken for granted and has been deeply internalized (Scott, 2014). Often, collaboration fails due to conflicts regarding this pillar, where actors from different backgrounds have biased definitions or understandings of the same issue. Cultural-cognitive alignment is an essential foundation for ensuring that communication among actors within a network remains free from distortions of meaning.

2.3. Integration of Network Governance and Scott's Institutional Pillars

Conventional approaches to network governance are often limited to mapping the formal structural relationships among actors but frequently overlook the structural and cultural

dynamics that shape those interactions. To bridge this analytical gap, this study integrates the network governance framework with the three institutional pillars formulated by W. Richard Scott: cognitive. This integration is based on the argument that the effectiveness of governance networks in poverty alleviation policies (such as TKPKD) is determined not only by which actors are involved, but also by how the rules of the game, values, and shared understandings are institutionalized within the network.

Conceptually, the relationship between the elements of network governance and Scott's three institutional pillars can be mapped as follows:




Figure 1. Institutional-Based Network Governance Analytic Framework. Adapted from Scott's Institutional Theory and Network Governance

Figure 1 illustrates the operationalization mechanism of the analytical framework that integrates institutional dimensions into the network governance structure. The framework's workflow proceeds sequentially from institutional inputs, through governance processes, to the achievement of policy outputs. The causal relationships and interactions among the elements in the figure are as follows:

- Scott's three institutional pillars (Input) serve as the primary foundations (structural drivers) that shape all operational activities within the network governance framework. The characteristics of formal rules, moral commitments, and shared perspectives that have become institutionalized at the local level will determine the quality and direction of the network governance elements in the field.
- Institutional articulation in the operationalization of governance (Process) demonstrates the tangible manifestation of how these three pillars function in the network's day-to-day activities. The regularity of interactions and the clarity of the division of bureaucratic responsibilities are directly driven by the effectiveness of the regulatory pillar. Meanwhile, the level of involvement of cross-sectoral actors and the functioning of substantive monitoring mechanisms reflect the strength of the impetus provided by the normative pillar as well as the alignment of the cultural-cognitive pillar among actors.
- The transition toward actor outcomes (outputs) represents the culmination of these systemic interactions. The successful transition from what was initially a formal-administrative coordination to a substantive and sustainable collaboration did not happen overnight. These outcomes are the logical result of the three institutional pillars working together to harmoniously support and strengthen every operational aspect within the governance network.

3. Research Method and Materials

3.1. Research Design

This study uses a qualitative approach with a comparative case study design focused on Bone Regency and Makassar City in South Sulawesi, Indonesia. Both cases involve Regional Poverty Alleviation Coordination Teams (Tim Koordinasi Penanggulangan Kemiskinan Daerah/TKPKD) as institutional arenas for coordinating poverty alleviation policies across governmental and non-governmental actors. The two cases were selected purposively to allow comparison between different local governance contexts while examining a common policy problem.

The comparison was designed not simply to describe similarities and differences between the two locations, but to identify institutional mechanisms that enable or constrain network governance. The analysis therefore examined how formal rules and mandates, shared responsibilities and norms, shared understandings, and inter-actor coordination shaped the institutionalization of network governance in each case.

3.2. Research Setting and Unit Analysis

The study was conducted in Bone Regency and Makassar City, South Sulawesi Province. The institutional focus was the Regional Poverty Alleviation Coordination Team (TKPKD), which is responsible for coordinating the formulation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of poverty alleviation efforts at the local level. The research documentation confirms that the TKPKD in Bone was formally established through the Regent's Decree No. 176/2023, while the Makassar TKPKD had been established institutionally but its formal decree was still being processed at the time of the study.

The unit of analysis was not the TKPKD as an organizational entity alone, but the practice of network governance within and around the TKPKD. Particular attention was given to coordination, communication, participation, information exchange, joint planning, collaborative action, monitoring, and accountability among actors involved in poverty alleviation.

To interpret these practices, the study integrated Scott's three institutional pillars as analytical dimensions. The regulative pillar refers to formal rules, mandates, authority, and accountability mechanisms; the normative pillar refers to shared expectations, responsibilities, values, and obligations; and the cultural-cognitive pillar refers to shared meanings, interpretations, perceptions, and understandings that shape actors' behaviour. The integration of these dimensions with the network governance perspective enabled the study to examine not only whether coordination occurred, but also how institutional conditions shaped the continuity and quality of network interactions.

3.3. Informant

The study involved ten key informants, comprising five informants from Bone Regency and five from Makassar City. The informants represented actors occupying relevant institutional positions within the local poverty alleviation network, including government agencies and other actors involved in coordination and collaborative activities.

The selection of key informants was based on their information richness and direct involvement in the governance process, rather than on statistical representativeness. This approach was consistent with the qualitative case study design, which sought to obtain in-depth information concerning institutional arrangements, inter-organizational coordination, actor participation, and collaborative practices within the TKPKD.

To protect confidentiality, informants were identified using codes: B01–B05 for Bone and M01–M05 for Makassar. These codes are used throughout the presentation of interview evidence in the Results section.

3.4. Data Collection and Analysis

Proses analisis dilakukan melalui kerangka pengodean (coding framework) yang terstruktur dengan mengalirkan keterkaitan antara tiga pilar institusional Scott dan elemen-elemen network governance. Transkrip wawancara diproses melalui tiga tahapan pengodean sekuensial: open coding (membuat kode awal dari transkrip), axial coding (mengelompokkan kode ke dalam kategori konseptual berdasarkan pilar teori), dan selective coding (merumuskan tema akhir). Tabel 1 menyajikan kerangka pengodean sistematis yang digunakan untuk mentransformasikan data empiris lapangan menjadi tema analitis.

Table 1. Thematic Analysis and Coding Framework

No	Analytical Dimension (Scott's Pillars)	Core Network Governance Elements	Initial Codes (Open Coding)	Emerging Themes Axial/Selective Coding)	Data Sources / Informants
1	Regulative Pillar	Formal mandates Authority structures Monitoring mechanisms	Delay in formal decrees; overlapping authority; rigid bureaucratic reporting; lack of enforcement	institutional Regulatory Constraints	B01, B02, M01, M03, Decree Docs
2	Normative Pillar	Shared responsibilities Actor participation Collaboration norms	Sectoral ego; low commitment; ceremonial meetings; loose moral obligations	Fragmented Normative Collaboration	B03, B05, M02, M04
3	Cultural-Cognitive Pillar	Shared understandings Common believe Communication	Discrepancies in defining poverty; mismatched expectations; cognitive distance between sectors	Misaligned Cognitive Conceptions	B04, M01, M05

Sources: The author's data analysis results, 2026

The data collection techniques used in this study were observation related to the object of activity, in-depth interviews with informants, observation of the daily activities of people classified as poor, and documentation sourced from several documents, including regulations, journals, and research results related to this study. To improve the validity and reliability of the data, this study used data triangulation. Triangulation was carried out by combining three data sources, namely in-depth interviews, participatory observation, and documentation. In addition, triangulation was also carried out between different informants to ensure the consistency of the data obtained from various perspectives (Miles et al., 2014).

The data obtained from interviews, observations, and documentation studies will be analyzed through the following stages: Data Reduction: Data obtained from interviews, observations, and documentation will be selected and chosen based on their relevance to the research questions. This process involves data coding and identification of main themes related to the implementation of network governance in poverty alleviation policies. Next is the data presentation stage, where the data obtained will be presented in the form of tables and diagrams that facilitate comparative analysis between themes and sub-themes. This presentation of data will help visualize the relationships between variables that emerge in the study. Then, the Conclusion and Verification stage is the final step of drawing conclusions based on the themes found during the analysis. Verification is carried out by comparing the findings with relevant literature and ensuring the suitability between the data obtained and the theory used in this study.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. The Transition in Governance Networks: From Formal Coordination to Substantive Collaboration

The TPKD has established formal institutional mechanisms to coordinate poverty alleviation efforts among relevant government agencies and nongovernmental actors in South Sulawesi. The TPKD is responsible for administering these policies, as detailed in Table 1:

Table 1. Duties and Functions of the Regional Poverty Alleviation Team (TKPKD)

No	Duties	Functions
1	Coordination	Coordination of planning and preparation of poverty alleviation policies
2	Planning	Developing a poverty alleviation action plan
3	Implementation	Coordinating policy implementation and developing partnerships
4	Monitoring	Monitoring and evaluating policies and managing public complaints

Sources: *Researcher Data Processing, 2024*

Although coordination and oversight functions have been formally established, as shown in Table 1, the research findings indicate serious obstacles to consistent implementation. Based on interviews with key informants in the field, it was found that the coordination meetings organized by the TKPKD do not take place on a regular basis. The meeting agenda tends to be situational or is only set when an annual program evaluation is approaching. The lack of a regular schedule for interaction hinders the exchange of information and program integration among agencies at the operational level, as stated by an informant as follows:

We hold those team meetings every three months, but they are held very rarely; usually, meetings are held only when we are preparing annual reports or when there is an evaluation coming up. (B04)

Based on the results of these interviews, it was found that the TKPKD's coordination meetings do not take place on a regular basis. The agenda for these meetings tends to be situational or is set only in the lead-up to the annual program evaluation. The lack of a regular schedule for these interactions hinders the exchange of information and program integration among agencies at the operational level.

These very limited meetings are generally reserved only for crucial ceremonial or administrative matters, such as the annual plenary meeting, the drafting of the annual Regional Action Plan (RAD), and the year-end evaluation. As a result, there is very little opportunity for technical discussions, periodic updates on poverty data, or the resolution of program challenges in the field.

The finding that these coordination meetings are not held on a regular basis serves as a strong indicator of the weakening of the regulatory and normative pillars within the TKPKD's institutional framework. From the perspective of Scott's (2014) regulatory pillar, the regularity of interaction should be driven by clear and binding rules. When formal legal instruments do not stipulate sanctions for absence or negligence regarding the coordination agenda, periodic meetings will be viewed as an optional administrative burden rather than a structural obligation.

This problem stems from the weakness of the normative pillars related to role expectations and the value of collective responsibility. When forums do not meet regularly, the commitment among actors to bind themselves to a shared vision of poverty alleviation begins to fade. Actors within the network revert to their conventional behavior, namely becoming trapped in sectoral self-interest within their respective agencies.

In comparison, this very low frequency of meetings has triggered specific negative impacts in each location:

- (a). In the city of Makassar, where the dynamics of urban poverty change almost every month (such as shifts in clusters vulnerable to poverty, unemployment issues, and population migration), holding meetings only three times a year makes the poverty database maintained by the TKPKD unresponsive (outdated). As a result, the planning and implementation of social assistance programs across government agencies often miss their mark due to the lack of intensive, periodic evaluations.
- (b). In Bone Regency, this low frequency of meetings poses a double challenge given the region's vast geographical area. The great distances between subdistricts and villages require intensive coordination mechanisms. When regency meetings are held only three times a year, actors at the grassroots level (subdistricts and villages) effectively lose their

sense of coordination and operate independently, resulting in the complete paralysis of monitoring functions and the management of public complaints.

These findings confirm that the limited frequency of interactions is one of the main root causes of why the formal structure of the TKPKD has failed to transform from a mere administrative institution into a substantive governance network.

This interpretation is supported by another informant who described the coordination mechanism as a forum that should be held regularly to integrate the work plans of local government organizations. The research findings show that the poverty alleviation programs implemented are recurring programs carried out annually as determined by the central government, as shown in Table 2 below:

Table 2. Poverty Alleviation Program

No	Cluster	Program	Remarks
1	Social protection	Family Hope Program (PKH)	Quarterly conditional cash assistance that covers pregnant women, young children, students, the elderly, and people with severe disabilities.
		Non-cash food assistance (BPNT)	Food assistance in the form of staple foods to meet caloric needs
		Social assistance (Bansos)	Rehabilitation services and support to meet the specific basic needs of neglected older adults and people with disabilities
		National Health Insurance. (JKN)	Full government subsidies for BPJS Kesehatan premiums to help low-income individuals access medical services
2	Access to education	Smart Indonesia Program (PIP) & People's School	Financial assistance for elementary and secondary education to prevent children from low-income families from dropping out of school
		Indonesia Smart Card (KIP) Lecture	Coverage of higher education costs and a monthly stipend for high-achieving students from low-income families Coverage of higher education costs and a monthly stipend for high-achieving students from low-income families
3	Business empowerment	National Economic Heroes Program (PENA)	The provision of capital for microenterprises is accompanied by intensive mentoring from the Ministry of Social Affairs
		Sinergi SiTaskin	A cross-ministerial policy coordinated by BP Taskin to promote the downstream development of small industries in rural areas
		Super Micro KUR interest subsidy	Working capital loans with minimal interest rates for microentrepreneurs who do not yet have formal collateral

Sources: Researcher Data Processing, 2024

Table 2 shows that the majority of programs in these three clusters are recurring programs designed and determined directly by the central government, with local governments acting as administrative implementers at the local level. These top-down programs have direct implications for the intensity of institutional interactions at the local level. The phenomenon of infrequent TKPKD coordination meetings in Bone Regency and Makassar City—which typically occur only a few times a year—is a logical consequence of this central government policy dominance.

When analyzed using W. Richard Scott's regulatory framework, the rules of the game, target objectives, and even the program's budget framework have been rigidly locked in by the relevant ministries through prescriptive technical guidelines. This highly centralized institutional structure narrows the scope of discretion available to local governments to engage in co-planning or make contextual adjustments to programs. As a result, the essence of TKPKD coordination meetings has shifted; these meetings no longer function as strategic

forums for integrating actions or formulating local solutions, but have merely become formalities for confirming and synchronizing administrative data predetermined by the central government. Local actors feel no urgency to hold regular meetings because their work agendas on the ground are already mechanically dictated by central regulations.

From a network governance perspective, these purely confirmatory interactions hinder the formation of substantive collaboration. In both Bone Regency and Makassar City, the TKPKD has become mired in formal bureaucratic routines. The network structure among actors, which should be dynamic and adaptive—has ultimately weakened, as coordination functions at the local level have been supplanted by regulatory compliance with central government directives.

4.2. Institutional Strategies for Strengthening the Institutionalization of Network Governance

The institutional strategy serves as a response to various operational obstacles that were previously identified, particularly those related to the dominance of top-down, directive programs and the infrequent coordination meetings at the regional level. The research findings indicate that, to enhance the effectiveness of poverty alleviation policies in South Sulawesi, it is necessary to formulate an institutional strategy that is more adaptive and responsive to local needs. This is consistent with the statement made by one of the informants:

Bappeda plays a crucial role in involving relevant stakeholders in all stages of the policy-making process. (B02/M03)

This statement clarifies that Bappeda's role in implementing poverty alleviation policies is that of the lead sector in driving the TKPKD network. This involvement includes mobilizing technical Regional Government Agencies (OPDs) and establishing channels of communication with non-governmental actors. This is evidenced by the existence of the Regional Poverty Alleviation Plan (RPKD) documents in both Bone Regency and Makassar City. Within these macro-level planning documents, Bappeda acts as the primary integrator, aligning cross-sectoral program proposals—ranging from social protection clusters to economic empowerment. This documented coordination model demonstrates that Bappeda's role as a network manager is not merely verbal but is grounded in a solid legal and administrative foundation at the regional level. Several related documents are listed in the following table:

Table 3. Legitimacy of Bappeda's Position within the TKPKD

No	Regulations	Contents	Remarks
1	Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri (Permendagri) No. 53 Tahun 2020	Operating Procedures, Work Coordination, and Institutional Development of the TKPK	The TKPKD Secretariat must be functionally integrated into the Bappeda structure.
2	SK Bupati Bone No. 176 Tahun 2023	Establishment of the Bone Regency Regional Poverty Alleviation Coordination Team for 2023–2024	The Head of Bappeda is the Secretary of the Team
3	SK Walikota Makassar	Establishment of the Makassar City Regional Poverty Alleviation Coordination Team 2023–2024	The Head of Bappeda is the Secretary of the Team

Sources: *Researcher Data Processing, 2024*

Table 3 shows Bappeda's functional role as the Secretariat of the TKPKD, where the Head of Bappeda serves directly as the team's secretary, acting as the leading sector and primary integrator. This indicates that Bappeda does not merely handle administrative matters but acts as the primary integrator, coordinating cross-sectoral programs (ranging from social protection to economic empowerment) and mobilizing both government actors (technical OPDs) and non-governmental actors.

This regulation is a regulatory instrument that exercises coercive power over various technical Regional Government Agencies (OPDs), compelling them to operate under the coordination of Bappeda. The supporting text confirms this by stating that this coordination framework

has a solid legal and administrative basis at the regional level. Without this regulatory decree, Bappeda would lack the formal authority to compel cross-sectoral actors to work in synergy.

Normatively, within the framework of governance values in Indonesia, Bappeda holds a reputation and role expectation as a macro-planning agency staffed by professional planners. The document mentions the opening of channels of communication with non-governmental actors. This involvement of external parties stems from the normative legitimacy that Bappeda is the most appropriate institution and has a moral obligation to align programs, ranging from social protection to economic empowerment. These actors comply with Bappeda's coordination because they believe it is the right thing to do and should be carried out in the public interest.

The uniform existence of TKPKDs across various regions indicates a cognitive institutionalization of how to define and address poverty. The concept that poverty must be addressed through a single macro-planning document that integrates various clusters has become a shared understanding among local bureaucrats. A fragmented (sectoral) approach to poverty alleviation is now cognitively viewed as an outdated and flawed model, and the TKPKD institutional model has been adopted as the only legitimate mental framework within modern bureaucracy for addressing poverty.

Based on the results of this study, an institutional strategy is needed to strengthen the institutionalization of network governance in poverty alleviation policies. The strategies formulated are derived from the gaps identified in the relationships and interactions among actors, as well as from the institutional conditions identified in Bone Regency and Makassar City. Thus, the proposed strategies are not intended as a list of normative recommendations, but rather as the result of an analysis that links empirical issues with the need for institutional strengthening.

4.3. Strengthening Networks of Actors and the Dynamics of Network Governance

The research findings indicate that the poverty alleviation network in Bone Regency and Makassar City has formally involved various stakeholders through the TKPKD. This structure essentially provides a framework for the involvement of both local government and non-governmental actors in supporting poverty alleviation. Table 4 details the organizational structure of the TKPKD in Bone Regency

Table 4. Organizational Structure of the Bone Regency TKPKD Team

No	Name/Title	Role on the team	Program management team
1	Bupati	Person In Charge (PIC)	
2	Wakil Bupati	Chairperson	
3	Sekretaris Daerah	Vice Chairperson	
4	Kepala Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah	Secretary	
5	Kepala Dinas Sosial	Vice Secretary	
6	Kepala Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Desa	Vice Secretary	
7	Kepala Dinas Kependudukan dan Pencatatan Sipil	Vice Secretary	
8	Asisten Administrasi Pemerintahan dan Kesejahteraan Rakyat Sekretariat Daerah Kab. Bone	Coordinator	Integrated Social Assistance and Social Security Programs for Households, Families, and Individuals
	13 OPD	Member	
9	Asisten Perekonomian dan Sumber Daya Alam	Coordinator	Community Empowerment and Micro and Small Business Strengthening Program Group
10	17 OPD	Member	
11	Sekretaris Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah	Chairperson	Team Secretariat
12	Sekretaris Dinas Sosial	Vice Chairperson	
	Kepala Bidang Pemerintahan dan Pembangunan Manusia Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah	Vice Chairperson	
13	28 Orang	Member	

Source: Analysis of research documentation data, 2026



Table 4 shows that, in terms of structure, the Bone Regency TKPKD is dominated by government actors. In fact, the integrated social assistance and social security program group, as well as the community empowerment program group, also include local government agencies as members; this indicates that the local government is the primary actor in the institutional network for poverty alleviation.

These data are consistent with the findings of Interview (B05), which indicated that, during coordination forums, participants were predominantly representatives of local government agencies (OPDs), although non-governmental actors—such as BAZNAS, HIPMI, and academics—were also invited and participated in certain meetings. This suggests that, although non-governmental actors are not formally included in the TKPKD's organizational structure, they are given the opportunity to participate in coordination efforts.

The interview findings also indicate that the involvement of non-governmental actors in TKPKD team meetings provides concrete support to poor and vulnerable communities, particularly through the provision of scholarships and capital assistance to micro- and small-business owners. Their contributions demonstrate that non-governmental actors possess resources and capacities that can complement government programs; however, their presence has not yet automatically translated into an institutionalized role within the formal structure of the TKPKD.

When viewed from the perspective of network governance, the findings of this study indicate that the resources for poverty alleviation do not lie solely with the government. The government possesses regulatory authority, administrative capacity, and public resources, while non-governmental actors such as BAZNAS and HIPMI possess social and economic resources that can complement government programs. Thus, the main issue is not merely the involvement of non-governmental actors, but how these contributions and resources can be integrated into more coordinated and sustainable institutional mechanisms.

The findings also indicate a distinction between participation in forums and substantive contributions within the network. The presence of HIPMI and academics in the forum indicates that there is room for non-governmental actors to interact with the government. However, participation in the forum does not in itself indicate that these actors hold an equal position in the decision-making process or policy implementation. Meanwhile, BAZNAS's contribution through scholarship assistance demonstrates that non-governmental actors can provide resources that complement government interventions.

From the perspective of network governance, this situation indicates that the poverty alleviation network in Bone Regency already includes multi-stakeholder elements, but the relationships among stakeholders have not yet fully developed into substantive collaboration. The government remains the dominant actor within formal structures and coordination forums, while non-governmental actors primarily occupy positions as parties involved in the forums or as contributors making specific contributions. Thus, the issue is not merely the absence of non-governmental actors, but rather the lack of institutional mechanisms that would enable various actors to participate consistently in agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation, and policy evaluation.

Strengthening network governance is not about increasing the number of TKPKD members, but rather about strengthening the quality of relationships among the actors. This transformation requires mechanisms capable of strengthening participation, interaction, resource sharing, shared responsibility, and institutional learning. In this context, the TKPKD has the potential to evolve from a formal multi-actor structure into a collective governance network, provided that the involvement of non-governmental actors does not stop at mere attendance at forums but develops into substantive participation in the policy-making process.

5. Conclusion

This study shows that poverty alleviation through the TKPKD already has a formal coordination framework but has not yet fully developed into a collaborative and substantive network of governance. Coordination is still dominated by government actors and tends to be oriented toward the integration of sectoral programs, while the involvement of non-government actors such as BAZNAS, HIPMI, and academics has not yet been fully institutionalized in the decision-making process and policy implementation. These findings suggest that strengthening network governance cannot be achieved solely through the establishment of formal structures and rules but requires institutional strategies capable of enhancing participation, shared responsibility, resource exchange, and a shared understanding among actors. From Scott's institutional perspective, the main challenge lies in strengthening the normative and cultural-cognitive pillars so that existing regulatory structures can evolve into collaborative practices that are more inclusive, adaptive to local contexts, and sustainable.

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